producers' political activities-is inconsistent with the First Amendment, 4 he responds by pointing to such cases as Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission 5 and Washington v. Davis. 6 In those cases, Professor Wiley suggests, the Supreme Court looked to the intentions of those who supported regulations in order to determine their validity-and did so without reference to First Amendment concerns.
But the difference between cases like Washington Apple and Davis, and antitrust cases, is an important part of the difference between Professor Wiley's argument and my own. In those cases, the Court examined intent in order to vindicate compelling constitutional values-specifically the protection of out-of-staters and racial minorities from local governmental discrimination. Professor Wiley, by contrast, would overturn state legislation to vindicate a statutory interest in economic competition-an interest the Court has found not to be constitutionally compelling. 7 One may, of course, dispute whether such an interest should be deemed as compelling as the interest in barring discrimination. But one certainly need not reverse Washington Apple, as Professor Wiley implies, in order to criticize his capture criterion on First Amendment grounds. 8 An underlying disagreement over the ordering of values can also be 4. My contention does not "expand[] to assert that a court violates the First Amendment whenever its historical investigation 'penalizes' political actors by supporting a judicial conclusion distasteful to them." Wiley, Revision and Apology, supra note 1, at 1288. There is nothing wrong with a court looking at legislative history in order to interpret the meaning of a statute. Professor Wiley's proposal, however, runs afoul of the First Amendment because it makes the validity of legislation turn on the identity of the person who lobbied for it. See Garland, supra note 2, at 512-18 (discussing Noerr and Hartlage cases). Indeed, because a substantial percentage of state regulations will necessarily fail Professor Wiley's efficiency criterion, see Garland, supra note 2, at 510, under his test their validity is likely to depend solely on whose lobbying resulted in their enactment. There are also other significant First Amendment differences between Professor Wiley's analysis and that employed in the cited cases. First, in large part, Wiley's test turns not on the intent but on the identity of the sponsors of legislation, and is expressly aimed at deterring a specified class of lobbyists ("producers") from seeking benefits through the political system. 9 he responds that judicial condemnation of Lochner did not result in the demise of all forms of substantive due process. The survival of substantive due process in some form, he argues, demonstrates that there is nothing inherently objectionable about his own proposal for substantive judicial scrutiny of state legislation. 10 But, once again, the difference between the case law to which Professor Wiley refers and the antitrust cases to which his test would apply is of critical significance. Where the Court has continued to employ substantive due process analysis in the post-Lochner era, it has done so to vindicate interests such as the protection of free speech or minority rights. It has not done so to vindicate a particular economic theory, whether it be the economic efficiency of the Chicagoans or the just economic distribution that Wiley suggests as an alternative." 1 This is not the place to moot what was "wrong" with Lochner. The question here is whether the economic efficiency or distribution notions that Professor Wiley has sketched are sufficiently compelling to justify the overriding of inconsistent political choices by state governments. The modern substantive due process cases provide no support for the proposition that they are. Nor can I accept that the Sherman Act has made them so-at least not without a substantially more explicit statement to that effect than Congress has ever made. 12 Finally, the disagreement that divides us is also implicit in Professor Wiley's challenge to the test I prefer over his own for distinguishing between state action that should be vulnerable to, and state action that should be immune from, Sherman Act attack. The better test, I suggest, protects states' efforts to regulate their economies, while exposing to scrutiny state laws that do no more than delegate to business competitors the power to restrain competition. The two-pronged requirement for immunity enunciated in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,13 which insists that the challenged restraint be "clearly articulated" as state policy and "actively supervised" by the state itself is, in my view, a tolerable proxy for such a result. 14 The problem with this test, according to Professor Wiley, is that it assertedly makes use of a "public/private distinction." Scholars, he contends, have demonstrated that such a distinction is not "natural," but rather must express the pursuit of some underlying value. But the scholarship to which Professor Wiley refers 1 -which questions the use of such a distinction in Fourteenth Amendment "state action" analysis-does not cast doubt upon the antitrust preemption test I argue for here.
First, despite the Court's unfortunate use of the phrase "state action" in its antitrust opinions, cases like Midcal do not seek to separate state from private action. On the contrary, they assume that both kinds of "action" under consideration (state regulation and state delegation) are actions of the state, and instead seek to separate that state action which is preempted by the Sherman Act from that which is not.
Second, I agree that this line is not a "natural" one, and that it does reflect a set of underlying values. Those values do not encompass a belief in the inherent benefit of economic regulation, but rather a respect for the political process that chooses it. Application of antitrust concepts to state law would drastically reduce the scope of state regulation, even as compared to Senator Sherman's time." 6 It is a respect for the decisions of elected local governments that counsels hesitation in adopting such a dramatic restructuring of American federalism in the absence of any mention of the possibility in the legislative history of the antitrust laws. 17 Professor Wiley is right in saying that the antidelegation rule just described is not the product of a "simple regard for federal antitrust policy" alone. 19 He errs, however, in looking only to policies internal to the Sherman Act-be they economic efficiency or the just distribution of consumer surplus-to determine how Congress would have wanted that Act applied to legislation passed by the states. Application of the Sherman Act to such legislation has implications for values far more fundamental to our society than those contained within the four corners of antitrust law alone, values which Congress shares and which therefore must be taken into account in any effort to divine congressional intentions. It is to those more fundamental values-particularly a respect for the political processes of American federalism-that the antidelegation rule responds.
19.
Id. at 1279.
